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excess of the $4,000, so that two lower ranking encumbrances
were paid out of the $4,000 because they were not subject to
the homestead exemption. One was a federal income tax lien
which is unaffected by state laws, 4 and the other was for building
materials (used to repair and improve the homestead) within
the constitutional exception from homestead exemption. 5 The
poor debtor was left with only $768.04 out of the $18,000 foreclosure sale price, but "he has no cause for complaint." 6

PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Liberative Prescription
In Succession of Picard,' plaintiff sought to recover the
amount of certain promissory notes executed by the decedent,
and the plea of prescription was overcome by proof of a pledge
which had been given to secure the indebtedness and which
served as a continuing acknowledgment constantly interrupting
the running of time.2 A point of particular interest was the
defendant's contention that the things pledged (other notes and
shares of stock) had no value, some of them having been of no
value even at the time they were pledged. Based upon the conclusion that there was a valid pledge, written on the back of
the notes representing the principal indebtedness, the court made
the point that the value or lack of value of the thing pledged
is irrelevant, because it is the pledgee's detention of the thing
which serves as the continuing acknowledgment and because the
pledgee is also under an obligation to return the pledged things
(upon payment of the debt) regardless of their value.
In Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 3 the plaintiff brought suit in
tort against the owner of an automobile for damage (wrongful
death) caused by an employee who was using the car with permission but not in the scope of his employment. However, the
owner's insurer was not joined in the suit until long after the
4. 239 La. 510, 518, 119 So.2d 446, 449 (1960), and authorities cited.
5. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1, par. 2.
6. 239 La. 510, 520, 119 So.2d 446, 449 (1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 455, 115 So.2d 817 (1959).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3520 (1870).
3. 239 La. 616, 119 So.2d 484 (1960).
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liberative prescription of one year had run. The question was
whether the suit against the owner (the insured) interrupted
prescription as against his insurer. The trial court and court of
appeal 4 held that there was no interruption and therefore that
the action against the insurer had prescribed. On first hearing,
the Supreme Court reversed, but on rehearing came back to what
the lower courts had held in the first place.
If there had been a solidary liability between the insured and
the insurer, suit against one would also have interrupted prescription against the other;5 but since there was no liability
here on the respondeat superior doctrine, the car owner was not
liable altogether. The insurer's liability would have been based
upon the omnibus provision covering damage caused by any person using the car with permission.
On the first hearing, the court held that the filing of a suit
interrupts prescription as to one not impleaded originally when
he is affected by the cause of actions involved, is closely associated with the named and cited defendant, and is fully informed
of the claim and the suit thereon.
With the existing law as it now stands, the court's opinion
on rehearing is correct in disregarding these connections as
bases for the interruption of prescription, because they are nowhere included in the legal provisions for interruption. Actual
knowledge by the debtor, or the creditor's ignorance of his identity, are not causes of interruption.
The court's sympathy for the plaintiff in the first hearing is
understandable. When parents lose a child in a fatal car accident, it may well be some time before they get around to the idea
and the action of seeking a base monetary compensation. In the
present case, the suit against the car owner was instituted on
the last day before the end of the one-year prescription. It was
about six weeks later when the defendant disclosed the name of
its insurer. Even if the plaintiff had acted immediately against
the insurer, it was already too late. Of course, the answer is
that the plaintiff should have acted sooner to ascertain the name
of the insurer; but perhaps a more realistic remedy for the situation would be a legislative change increasing the time for such
a serious prescription.
4. Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 111 So.2d 375 (La. App. 1959).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3552 (1870).

